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NOTES
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER
CIVIL RICO CLAIMS
In 1970 Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)I as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act. 2 Until 1982, however, no court considered whether state
courts share concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over civil 3
RICO claims. 4 Since then many courts, both state and federal, have
addressed this issue, and they have reached conflicting conclusions. 5
No federal appellate court has yet directly considered the issue. 6
Under the Supreme Court's opinion in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,7 analysis of state-court jurisdiction over a federal cause of
action "begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concur1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C.
99 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 42, 45, 46, and 47

U.S.C.).
3 RICO authorizes provides both criminal prosecutions for violations, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and a private cause of action, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1982).
4
Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (holding jurisdiction over civil
RICO concurrent).
5 For cases holdingjurisdiction over RICO exclusively federal, see Spence v. Flynt,
647 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Wyo. 1986); Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp.
584 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla.
1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985); County
of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill.
1983), aff'd on othergrounds, 773
F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985); Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. WashingtonGolf Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 501 N.E.2d 1290 (1986); Levinson v. American Accident Reinsurance Group, 503 A.2d 632 (Del. Ch. 1985); Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Il. App. 3d 712,495 N.E.2d 1132 (1986); Maplewood Bank and Trust Co. v.
Acorn, Inc., 207 NJ. Super. 590, 504 A.2d 819 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468,489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985); Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d
305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). For cases holding that states share concurrent jurisdiction
over civil RICO claims, see Contemporary Services Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Carman v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.
Ky. 1986); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1986); Karel v. Kroner,
635 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Cianci v. Superior Court (Poppingo), 40 Cal. 3d 903,
710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
6 The Seventh Circuit, however, in County of Cook v. Midcon Corp. noted in dictum
that if it had reached the issue, it would have been reluctant to uphold the district court's
finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction over RICO claims. 773 F.2d 892, 905 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1985).
7

453 U.S. 473 (1981).
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rent jurisdiction." 8 Recognizing that Congress has the power to
limit a federal claim to federal courts, "the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive,
by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests." 9
Applying the Gu/f Offshore analysis, this Note argues that state
courts share jurisdiction with federal courts over civil RICO claims.
First, the language of civil RICO's jurisdictional grant' 0 does not
constitute an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction; the
Supreme Court has interpreted similar language in another federal
statute as consistent with the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." Second, the legislative history of RICO does not contain an
unmistakable implication that Congress intended to limit civil RICO
actions to federal courts.' 2 In fact, Congress never even considered
the issue of state court jurisdiction.13 Finally, state court adjudication of civil RICO claims advances rather than obstructs federal interests. 14 State court adjudication presents injured parties with
additional fora for redress and relieves federal court dockets.
This Note recommends that Congress amend the jurisdictional
provision in RICO to communicate explicitly that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. Such an amendment
would curb the trend of federal courts acquiescing to state court
determinations of civil RICO jurisdiction when that issue arises in
the res judicata context. 15 This trend poses special problems. By
holding that they lack jurisdiction, state courts could clear their
dockets of the rising number of RICO claims and thrust them on
federal dockets. In addition, Congress should clarify the statute
simply to relieve parties and courts from having to address this procedural issue and to allow them to focus on the substantive cause of
action.
8 Id. at 478; see also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
9 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478.
10 "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
11 See Dowd Box, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (holding that the jurisdictional grant in the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), is not an explicit statutory
directive of exclusive jurisdiction). See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 55-76, 202-15 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 77-112, 216-34 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
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I
BACKGROUND

A.

Determining Exclusivity of Jurisdiction

Courts presume that state and federal courts share concurrent
jurisdiction over a federal cause of action.' 6 Only three factors can
rebut this presumption: (1) an explicit statutory grant of exclusive
jurisdiction; (2) an unmistakable implication in the statute's legislative history that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction; or (3) a
clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and the federal
interests underlying the statute.1 7 Any one of these prongs alone
rebuts the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.
1.

The Presumption of ConcurrentJurisdiction: The General Rule

The Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction over all federal
causes of action shall be presumed to be concurrent between state
and federal courts.1 8 This presumption emerges from the Constitutional grant to Congress of the power to create lower federal courts
and the discretion to define the role of such lower courts. t 9 Congress could have opted not to form lower federal courts, 20 leaving
only state courts to adjudicate federal causes of action, subject to
review by the Supreme Court. 2 ' The drafters, therefore, apparently
intended concurrent jurisdiction to be "the rule, rather than the exception. ' 2 2 Additionally, the presumption of concurrent jurisdic16 See supra note 8 and infra note 18.
17 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478 (announcing the three-pronged test to rebut the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction).
18 Id. (holding jurisdiction concurrent over Outer Continental Shelf Land Act). See
also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (holding jurisdiction concurrent over Labor-Management Relations Act); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130
(1876) (holding jurisdiction concurrent over Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 9 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.").
20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."); see, e.g., Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)
(holding that Congress has complete power to regulate lower federal court jurisdiction).
21
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
Indeed, although federal courts had jurisdiction over some federal claims, Congress did
not vest the federal courts with general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. Act of
Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875); see 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.3[2] (2d ed. 1988) (describing the
origins of federal question jurisdiction).
22 Redish & Muench, Adjudication of FederalCauses ofAction in State Court, 75 MICH. L.
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tion is based upon the principle of dual state and national
sovereignty in our federal system. In Claflin v. Houseman 23 the
Supreme Court explained,
The laws of the United States are laws in the several States,
and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the
State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as
regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty.... The fact that a State court
derives its existence and functions from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief [over federal claims]; because it
is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much
bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to
recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of
jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State;
and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each
other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the
same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly
concurrent. 24
2.

Exclusive FederalJurisdiction: Rebutting the Presumption

The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is rebuttable. In
Gulf Offshore Corp. v. Mobil Oil.,25 the Supreme Court announced the
modem test 26 for rebuttal when it declared that, "the presumption

of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory
directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by
a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests." 27 Satisfying one of these three prongs is the only
method to rebut the presumption 28 and to allow federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claim.
a. Explicit Statutory Directive of Exclusive Jurisdiction.
An explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction will rebut
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, thus limiting jurisdicREV. 311, 314 (1976) (footnote omitted) ("Because state courts are bound by the terms
of the supremacy clause to apply federal law, it seems reasonable to infer that the framers contemplated that concurrent state jurisdiction over federal causes of action would
be the rule, rather than the exception.").
23
93 U.S. 130 (1876).
24 Id. at 136-37.
25

453 U.S. 473 (1981).

As early as 1876, the Supreme Court announced an exception to the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction when the state jurisdiction over a federal claim "is not
excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case." Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
27 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478.
28 See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 (1982) ("Only [the Gulf Offshore factors]
will rebut the presumption [of concurrent jurisdiction].").
26
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tion to federal courts. 29 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not
described what constitutes an explicit statutory directive. An analysis of how courts have applied this prong of the Gulf Offshore test to
several federal statutes clarifies the appropriate standard for an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction.
Congress has the power to confer exclusive federal court jurisdiction 30 or concurrent jurisdiction 31 over particular federal laws.
Congress has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts in statutes concerning federal crimes, 3 2 bankruptcy, 33 and
patents and copyrights. 3 4 In each of these statutes, Congress included the word "exclusive" in its jurisdictional grant. Despite the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, Congress has also provided
explicitly for concurrent jurisdiction in federal statutes, such as the
Federal Employers Liability Act 35 and the Securities Act of 1933.36
See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478.
See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512 (1944) ("Congress could determine whether the federal courts which it established should have exclusive jurisdiction
of such cases [arising under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942] or whether they
should exercise that jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of the States."); see also LA
J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.201 (2d
29
30

ed. 1987) [hereinafter

IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]

("Congress can determine

whether the federal courts it has established should have exclusive jurisdiction of cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States or whether they should
exercise that jurisdiction concurrently with the state courts.") (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Bowles, 321 U.S. at 512 ("Congress could determine whether the federal
31
courts which it established . . . should exercise that jurisdiction concurrently with the
courts of the States."); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517
(1898) ("leaving to Congress to determine whether the courts to be established by it
from time to time should be given exclusive cognizance of such cases or controversies,
or should only exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the courts of the several States.");

see also

IA MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,

supra note 30, at 0.201.

18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982) ("The district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States."). Courts have interpreted this language to grant explicitly exclusive federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir.
1986) ("Federal district courts have original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
against the laws of the United States."); Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 195 U.S. 628 (1904).
33
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. IV 1986) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11."). Both state and federal courts have interpreted this language to grant
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts. See, e.g., Stout v. Green, 131 F.2d 995 (9th Cir.
1942); Franckowiak v. Nelson, 223 Neb. "9, 387 N.W.2d 707 (1986).
34
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) ("Suchjurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of
the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases."). State and federal
courts have interpreted this language to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.
See, e.g., Topolos v. Caldeway, 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983); Van Prods. Co. v. General
Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
35
45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982) ("The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States...
shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States."). The Supreme Court
held that state courts have jurisdiction over claims under this provision. See Burnett v.
32
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Congress included the word "concurrent" in both jurisdictional
grants.
Unfortunately, many jurisdictional grants lack such clarity. Ambiguous phrases such as "may be brought in any district court of the
United States,"' 37 "may sue ... in any district court of the United
States," 38 and "may institute an action.., in the United States district court"3

9

cause difficulty. Courts must determine whether these

ambiguous jurisdictional grants confer exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. The word "may" as a permissive 40 rather than a
mandatory4 term might permit suit in federal-court but not forbid
state-court adjudication.
Most courts have held that jurisdictional grants containing the
word "may" in this context fail to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney42 (hereinafter
Dowd Box), in which the Supreme Court construed § 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 4 3 is the seminal case inNew York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (confirming state court jurisdiction over
FELA claims).
36
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) ("The district courts of the United States... shall have
jurisdiction... concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter."). See,
e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975) (state courts
share concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over claims under the Securities Act).
37 Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). See also
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, § 105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1982) ("may be
brought, without regard to the amount in controversy, in the district court of the United
States").
38 Bank Holding Company Act, tit. I, § 106(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982). See also
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 901(a) 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (1982)
("may sue ... in any appropriate United States district court.").
39 National Flood Insurance Act, title XIII, § 1333, 42 U.S.C. § 4053 (Supp. IV
1986) [hereinafter NFIA].
40
See Harper v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 494 F. Supp. 234, 239 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (construing the word "may" in NFIA as permissive and therefore consistent with
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction); Burrell v. Turner Corp., 431 F. Supp. 1018,
1020 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (same); see also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502, 506 (1962) (construing "may" in the Labor Management Relations Act to grant
concurrent jurisdiction); Ted's Tire Serv., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F. Supp.
163, 165 (D. Conn. 1979) (construing "may" in the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
to grant concurrent jurisdiction). But see Schultz v. Director, Fed. Emergency Management Agency, 477 F. Supp. 118 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (finding that "may" in the jurisdictional
grant of NFIA was not intended to define the proper forum for claims); Dunkle v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 489 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (same).
41 Some courts have suggested that the terms "shall" or "must be brought in district courts" indicate exclusive jurisdiction. See Dowd Box, 368 U.S. at 506 ("[Section
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act] provides that suits... 'may' be brought
in the federal district courts, not that they must be."); Harper,494 F. Supp. at 239 (noting the widely accepted interpretation that "shall" is construed as mandatory or directive, while "may" is construed as merely permissive or discretionary).
42 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
43 Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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terpreting the use of "may" in a jurisdictional grant. The statute
directs that "[s]uits for violation ... may be brought in any district
court of the United States. . .. ,,44 The Supreme Court summarily
dismissed the notion that this statutory language confers exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts. It noted that the language merely
gives federal courts jurisdiction over such claims without suggesting
exclusivity. 4 5 Other courts have relied upon the distinction between
permissive and mandatory language that Dowd Box first suggested.
For example, courts analyzing the language of the Bank Holding
Company Act 4 6 and the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 47 have
held that the use of the word "may" in the Acts' jurisdictional grants
fails to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 48 Courts
interpreting the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA)4 9 typically apply the Dowd Box analysis and conclude that the phrase "may institute an action ... in the United States district court" 50 comports
with the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 5'
Courts' application of the Guf Offshore three-pronged test to
various federal statutes sheds light on the nature of an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction: statutes explicitly grant exclusive jurisdiction by using the word "exclusive" in the
Id.
Dowd Box, 368 U.S. at 506 ("It has not been argued, nor could it be, that § 301(a)
speaks in terms of exclusivity of federal court jurisdiction over controversies within the
statute's purview.... It provides that suits of the kind described 'may' be brought in the
federal district courts, not that they must be.").
46
Bank Holding Company Act, tit. 1, § 106(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982) ("may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States").
47
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, § 105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1982) ("may
be brought ...in the district court of the United States").
48
See Lane v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 756 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the Bank Holding Company Act to confer concurrent jurisdiction); Ted's Tire
Serv. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1979) (interpreting the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to confer concurrent jurisdiction).
49 National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIII, 82 Stat. 572 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
50 42 U.S.C. § 4053 (Supp. IV 1986).
51 See Harper v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 494 F. Supp. 234, 239 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (construing the NFIA as consistent with presumption of concurrent jurisdiction);
Burrell v. Turner Corp., 431 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (same). But see
Dunkle v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 489 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (arguing that
"may" in the jurisdictional grant of the NFIA was not intended to define the proper
forum for claims); Schultz v. Director, Fed. Emergency Management Agency, 477 F.
Supp. 118 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (same).
The courts have generally relied on the Dowd Box distinction between permissive
and mandatory language. See, e.g., Kelly v. Director, Fed. Emergency Management
Agency, 549 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Mass. 1981) ("The grant ofjurisdiction in § 4053 [using
the word "may"] is phrased in permissive terms."); Bains v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 440
F. Supp. 15, 16 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (Congress's use of the permissive term "does not reflect
an intent to completely exclude state court review of flood insurance problems.").
44
45
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jurisdictional grant 5 2 and explicitly grant concurrent jurisdiction by
using the word "concurrent" in the jurisdictional grant. 53 Because
the use of the permissive term "may" in ajurisdictional grant fails to
communicate an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction,54 the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction prevails.
Unmistakable Implication of Exclusive Jurisdictionfrom
Legislative History.
The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction may be rebutted by an
unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction from legislative
history. 5 5 The Supreme Court first suggested that a statute may imply exclusive jurisdiction from its legislative history in Claflin v.
Houseman.56 Yet the Supreme Court has never clearly explained the
notion of implied exclusivity.
58
57
Judicial handling of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts
evidences the confusion surrounding the Claflin notion of implied
exclusivity. 59 The jurisdictional language of both statutes provides
that civil suits "may be" brought in federal district courts. 60 Despite
this permissive jurisdictional language, courts have uniformly concluded that jurisdiction under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts is
61
exclusively federal.
Courts finding exclusive jurisdiction under the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts fail to explain their holdings. 62 Courts may
have found the Acts to confer exclusive jurisdiction because each
Act's legislative history reveals that Congress rejected amendments
b.

See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
55 See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) ("This jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive by express
56
enactment and sometimes by implication.").
57
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1982).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
58
59 See Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 316 ("The experience with the Sherman
and Clayton antitrust acts is illustrative of the Claflin rule's lack of guidance.").
60
Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States"). Sherman Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4
(1982) ("The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
).
prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title ....
61
See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
379 (1985) ("federal antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts."); General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (holding
jurisdiction over Sherman Act exclusively federal).
62 See, e.g., Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252
U.S. 436 (1920) (concluding without reasoning that jurisdiction over the Clayton Act is
exclusively federal); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979) (same); Banana Distrib. Inc. v. United Fruit Co.,
269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959) (same).
52
53

1988]

CONCURRENTJURISDICTION

1055

to make jurisdiction expressly concurrent. 63 Further examination of
the legislative history, however, indicates that in rejecting the
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress intended jurisdiction to remain concurrent; 6 4 conversely, in rejecting the amendment to the Clayton Antitrust Act, Congress intended jurisdiction to
65
be exclusively federal.
Courts also may have found implied exclusive jurisdiction
under the Clayton Act because Congress enacted it to complement
the Sherman Act, 66 and courts have limited actions under the Sherman Act to federal courts. The conflict between the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the Acts arises at least partially
from the Claflin Court's failure to specify guidelines for determining
67
circumstances which imply exclusive jurisdiction.
Courts also have difficulty applying the Claflin test when interpreting congressional silence on jurisdictional issues. 68 Before the
Supreme Court interpreted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
63 See 51 CONG. REC. 9662-64 (1914) (A rejected amendment to the Clayton Antitrust Act proposed an explicit directive of concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions.).
64 A proposed amendment to the Sherman Act would have made jurisdiction explicitly concurrent, but Congress rejected it. Congress assumed that Sherman Act jurisdiction was already concurrent. As one senator remarked during floor debate, "[This
statute as it stands without amendment] leaves everybody . . . to sue anybody who
wrongs him ... in a State court if he chooses to do so. So I ... make the suggestion to
him that his amendment is quite useless and unnecessary." S. Doc. No. 147, 57th
Cong., 2d Sess., 316 (1903). See also Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Private Civil Actions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 509, 510 n.13 (1957) (discussing Sherman Act's
legislative history).
65 See 51 CONG. REc. 9662-64 (1914).
66
Congress passed the Clayton Act to expand the limited scope of the Sherman
Act. The chief deficiency of the Sherman Act is that its standards are too high. It requires monopoly, attempted monopoly or anticompetitive effects to comprise a violation. In response, Congress enacted the Clayton Act, which has been called an
"incipiency" statute because it prohibits activities which tend to produce anticompetitive
effects in the economy. See L. SuLavAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 713
(1977) (The Clayton Act was "enacted to supplement the Sherman Act and to arrest
incipient Sherman Act violations."). See, e.g., Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 App.
Div. 443, 449, 106 N.Y.S. 115, 119 (1907), in which the court noted,
We may eliminate from consideration the statutes of the United States
[Sherman Act § 1] ... because they have no bearing upon the cause of
action here presented. They relate only to matters in restraint of trade or
commerce between or among the several states of the Union or with foreign nations, and for a violation of their provisions redress must be
sought in the federal courts, which alone have jurisdiction.
See also Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J. Super., 433 A.2d 780 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1981). See Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 317 (This confusion over
congressional intent "was at least partially attributable to the failure of the Supreme
Court to enunciate standards for the determination of implied exclusivity.").
67
See Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 317 (This confusion over Congressional
intent "was at least partially attributable to the failure of the Supreme Court to enunciate standards for the determination of implied exclusivity.").
68
For a more thorough discussion of this and other examples, see id. at 319-25.
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Act 69 (OCSLA) to confer concurrent jurisdiction, both state and
federal courts had held jurisdiction to be exclusively federal. 70 OCSLA's jurisdictional grant gives federal district courts original jurisdiction but does not specify whether such jurisdiction is exclusive or
concurrent. 7 1 In Gravois v. Travelers Indmnity Co. ,72 a state court held
that OCSLA's legislative history implies exclusive federal court jurisdiction. The court compared OCSLA to the Jones Act, 73 reasoning that because Congress specified concurrent jurisdiction under
the Jones Act but not under OCSLA, Congress must have intended
exclusive jurisdiction under OCSLA.74 Contrary to the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the court mistakenly interpreted
congressional silence to imply exclusive jurisdiction. 7 5 The
Supreme Court corrected this mistake in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
76
Co., holding OCSLA jurisdiction concurrent.
Unfortunately, courts have not defined what constitutes an unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction from legislative history. An analysis of the judicial treatment of the Sherman, Clayton
and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Acts fails to supply uniform
69
70

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
See, e.g., Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc. v. Rucker Co., 341 F. Supp. 757, 760 (E.D. La.

1972) (federal court holding jurisdiction over OCSLA exclusively federal); Gravois v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So.2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (state court declaring lack of
jurisdiction over OCSLA claim). Cf Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27, 30 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("the federal Trial Court ... is the Court to which Congress committed
primary, if not exclusive, jurisdiction ..
"), aff'd on othergrounds, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).'
71
The Act posits that the United States shall have exclusive political jurisdiction
over the shelf lands, but it does not mandate exclusivejudicialjurisdiction. The statute's
political jurisdictional grant reads, "The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf... to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State .. " OCSLA, § 4(a)(1), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333(a)(1) (1982).
The statute's judicial jurisdictional grant provides that the United States district
courts "shall have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection
with any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf ... Proceedings with
respect to any such case or controversy may be instituted in the judicial district in which
any defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial district of the State nearest the
place the cause of action arose." OCSLA, § 23(b)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (1982).
72
173 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
73 Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) § 20,46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982) ("Jurisdiction . . . shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located.").
74 Gravois, 173 So. 2d at 556. ("The failure to [specify concurrent jurisdiction as in
the Jones Act] shows their intention to retain [exclusive] jurisdiction in the United States
Courts.").
75 Id.
76 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 482-83 (1981) ("We do not
think the legislative history of OCSLA can be read to rebut the presumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction, given Congress' silence on the subject in the statute
itself.").
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principles that would clarify the second prong of the Gulf Offshore
test.
c.

Clear Incompatibility Between State-CourtAdjudication and
Federal Interests

Even if a statute makes no reference to exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction and even if its legislative history fails to imply exclusive
federal jurisdiction unmistakably, federal courts may still retain exclusive jurisdiction over a federal claim if state-court adjudication of
the claim would jeopardize federal interests. 7 7 This third prong of
the Gulf Offshore test requires a "disabling incompatibility" between
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 7 8 The Supreme Court has identified
three factors for determining when state-court adjudication jeopardizes federal interests, thus justifying exclusive federal jurisdiction:
"the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal
79
courts to peculiarly federal claims."
In Gulf Offshore, the Supreme Court addressed whether statecourt jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 80
would frustrate the operation of that Act. The Court concluded that
because the Act fills gaps in its coverage with state law where state
law is "applicable and not inconsistent,"8 1 and because state law
often will determine claims under the federal OCSLA statute, the
three factors of uniformity, expertise and hospitality did not rebut
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. The Court explained,
These factors [uniformity, expertise, and hospitality] cannot support exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims whose governing
77 Id at 478 (As part of its three-pronged test for rebutting the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court announced that "a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests" may rebut the presumption.).
78 Id. at 477 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08
(1962).
79 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 483-84, citing Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 32935; see also Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 509, 511-15 (1957).
80 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
81 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 480 ("All law applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf
is federal law, but to fill the substantial 'gaps' in the coverage of federal law, OCSLA
borrows the 'applicable and not inconsistent' laws of the adjacent States as surrogate
federal law."). See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(A) (1982). That subsection reads in pertinent
part,
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws .... the civil and criminal laws of each
adjacent State... are declared to be the law of the United States for that
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf....
43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(A) (1982).
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rules are borrowed from state law. There is no need for uniform
interpretation of laws that vary from State to State. State judges
have greater expertise in applying these laws and certainly cannot
be thought unsympathetic to a claim only because it is labeled fed82
eral rather than state law.
In Gulf Offshore, the Supreme Court stated that courts should
consider uniformity of interpretation as a federal interest in favor of
exclusive federal jurisdiction.8 3 The Supreme Court has indicated,
however, that uniform interpretation is attainable without exclusive
jurisdiction. 84 In Great Northern Railway v. Merchants Elevator Co.,85
the appellant contended that both federal and state courts lacked
initial jurisdiction over cases involving construction of an interstate
tariff because separate determinations by various courts would destroy uniformity under the tariff. The appellant argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission must interpret the statute first to
ensure uniformity. 86 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Because interstate tariffs constitute federal law, the Supreme Court
can review any construction of them. Accordingly, Supreme Court
87
review is sufficient to foster uniform interpretation.
The Supreme Court extended this reasoning and conclusion in
82

Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 484.

83

Id. at 483-84.

84 See, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1922)
(the desire for uniformity over the construction of interstate tariffs does not relieve federal and state courts ofjurisdiction to construe those tariffs before the Interstate Commerce Commission does); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1961) (the desire for uniformity of interpretation of the Natural Gas Act
does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over claims arising under that Act because
oversight by the Supreme Court will insure uniformity); see also Nordlicht v. New York
Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the desire for uniform interpretation alone does not require exclusive jurisdiction of a federal common law claim),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 929 (1987).
85 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
86 Id. at 289. Although this might appear an administrative law question concerning the exhaustion of state remedies, the Supreme Court analyzed the issue in jurisdictional terms. It specifically addressed the effect on uniformity if state and federal courts
had jurisdiction to construe an interstate tariff before the Interstate Commerce Commission had such an opportunity. Id. at 290-91.
87
Id. In response to the argument that the interests of uniformity required resort
to the Interstate Commerce Commission before one could resort to the courts, Justice
Brandeis maintained,
This argument is unsound. It is true that uniformity is the paramount purpose of the Commerce Act. But it is not true that uniformity in
construction of a tariff can be attained only through a preliminary resort
to the Commission to settle the construction in dispute. Every question
of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question of law; and where the
question concerns an interstate tariff it is one of federal law. If the parties
properly preserve their rights, a construction given by any court, whether
it be federal or state, may ultimately be reviewed by this court either on
writ of error or on writ of certiorari; and thereby uniformity in construction may be secured. Hence, the attainment of uniformity does not re-
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interpreting the Natural Gas Act. 88 In Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
Superior Court8 9 the petitioner argued that state-court adjudication of
suits under the Natural Gas Act would threaten uniform regulation
under the Act. 90 Rejecting this contention, the Court applied its
analysis from Great Northern Railway.91 The Court added that "it
should be remembered that the route to review by this Court is
open to parties aggrieved by adverse state-court decisions of federal
questions." '9 2 The Supreme Court's ability to review state court decisions mitigates the damage to uniformity from state-court adjudication. 9 3 Thus, the desire for uniformity alone does not require
exclusive jurisdiction.
Yet uniformity remains a factor in the analysis. Perhaps courts
should consider the latitude statutes afford for the interpretation of
federal rights in determining the significance of uniformity. If the
statute is specific, the "likelihood of future judicial gloss is comparatively limited," 9 4 and state-court adjudication poses a lesser threat
to uniform interpretation. Conversely, if the statute is vague, affording courts "wide latitude in developing federal rights," 95 statecourt adjudication could jeopardize national uniformity of those
rights.
The second factor in determining whether state-court adjudication jeopardizes federal interests is the relative expertise of federal
and state judges in deciding questions of federal law. Courts have
not elucidated standards for determining when expertise of federal
judges weighs in favor of exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
concluded in Gulf Offshore, however, that federal judges actually have
less expertise than state judges over federal statutes incorporating
96
state law as their governing rules.
The third factor addresses the hospitality that state courts may
extend to federal claims. Federal courts have prevented state courts
from interfering with federal programs and federal claims to which
quire that in every case where the construction of a tariff is in dispute
there shall be a preliminary resort to the Commission.
Id
88
89

Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-719o (1982).
366 U.S. 656 (1961).

Id at 665.
Id. at 665-66.
Id at 665.
93
Nevertheless, the overly burdened Supreme Court docket suggests that the
Court can promote uniformity in few statutory schemes.
94
Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 331.
90
91
92

95

Id.

Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 484 ("State judges have greater expertise in applying"
laws "whose governing rules are borrowed from state law."); see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96

1060

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1047

they are unsympathetic. 9 7 For example, state courts lack jurisdiction to control directly the actions of federal officials by mandamus, 98 or by injunction. 9 9 Civil rights actions provide a classic
example of state-court inhospitality to federal claims. The danger
of state court antagonism is severe because the Acts are designed to
enforce federal rights against state action. 10 0 In Alabama Ex. Rel.
Gallion v. Rogers,' 0 1 the federal district court denied Alabama courts
jurisdiction to enjoin the United States Attorney General from procuring documents under the Civil Rights Act of 1960.102 The district court offered two alternative bases for its holdings. First, it
held that section 305 of the Act' 0 3 vested exclusive jurisdiction in
federal courts.' 0 4 Second, it held that state courts may not enjoin
the acts of federal officers nor even review their discretion. 10 5
The danger of state-court antagonism is least severe with regard to federal statutes that incorporate state law principles. 10 6
Such statutes do not warrant exclusive federal jurisdiction. The interests of the locality will coincide with the federal claim because the
law of the locality governs it. If state courts have sympathy for certain principles under state law, there is no reason to believe that
97

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 167 (1969), quoted in Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 330

n.76 ("Where the difficulty is not misunderstanding of federal law, but lack of sympathy-or even hostility-toward it, there is a marked advantage in providing an initial
federal forum. Such attitudes are perhaps less common among federal judges, chosen
and paid by the national government, and enjoying the protection of life tenure, than
they are in the state judiciary.").
98 See, e.g., McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (holding that state
courts lacked subject matterjurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal officer);
see also Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225
(1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942) (same).
99 See, e.g., Ex ParteShockley, 17 F.2d 133 (N.D. Ohio 1926); Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 330
(3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960).
100 Alabama ex. rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per
curiam sub. nom. Dinkens v. Rogers, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913
(1961). The court asserted that "the entire history of the [Civil Rights] Act reflects that
it was and is designed to provide a means of enforcing the basic federally guaranteed
rights of citizenship (to vote) against state action." Id. at 852.
101
102
103
104

Id.

Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 1947b et seq. (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 1974d (1982).
Alabama ex. rel. Gallion, 187 F.Supp. at 852 (Applying the then prevailing Claflin
language, the court reasoned that state court jurisdiction would be "incompatible from
the 'particular nature of the case' and would frustrate national purposes.").
105 Id. ("[T]he state court... injunction.., was in violation of the basic legal principle that state courts are without jurisdiction to review the discretion or enjoin the acts of
federal officers.").
106 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981) ("State judges
... certainly cannot be thought unsympathetic to a claim only because it is labeled federal rather than state law.").
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they will lack sympathy for those same principles when incorporated
07
into federal law.'
Some commentators suggest that a potentially burdensome
number of claims under a new statute supports a finding of concur08
rent jurisdiction if only to relieve pressure on the federal docket.
Concurrent jurisdiction distributes the caseload between state and
federal fora.
In sum, it is difficult to rebut the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction by showing an incompatibility between state-court adjudication and federal interests. First, the desire for uniformity alone
fails to indicate a clear incompatibility between state-court adjudication and federal interests because Supreme Court review promotes
uniformity.' 0 9 Second, it is difficult to conclude that the expertise of
federal judges mandates exclusive federal jurisdiction in the absence
0 Third, few statof any standard for making such a determination. 11
utory claims spark the kind of state-court antagonism toward the
federal claim that may require exclusive jurisdiction.1 1 1 A recent
federal appellate court expressed the difficulty of rebutting the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction through this third prong of the
Gulf Offshore analysis as follows: "Mindful of the cautions expressed
by the Supreme Court concerning exclusivity of federal statutory
claims, we think it would take a truly extraordinary set of circumstances to demonstrate that a claim arising under federal common
' 12
law is within exclusive federal court jurisdiction." "
B.

RICO: Its Evolution and Synthesis

In an effort to apply properly the Gulf Offshore test to civil RICO,
this Note briefly examines the origins and evolution of RICO. It
describes the context from which RICO arose, the problems Congress intended it to address, and the legislative history of the statute, paying close attention to the origin of RICO's jurisdictional
Id
See Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 334 ("[1]f the number of claims under the
statute is likely to be burdensome, a court might properly find jurisdiction to be concurrent, in order to distribute the projected case load among the federal and state judicial
systems."); see also Note, supra note 64, at 516 ("When a large number of cases are expected to arise under a particular statute ... efficient distribution of the case burden
suggests that exclusive jurisdiction is inappropriate.").
109 See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
111
See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
112
Nordlicht v. New York Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
state courts share concurrent jurisdiction over the federal common law claim of "money
had and received" and the federal common law claim of fraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1055 (1987).
107

108
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grant. In addition, this section illustrates judicial treatment of civil
RICO claims.
1. Origin of RICO
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Americans became increasingly aware of the effects of organized crime on society. In 1951,
the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime (the
Kefauver Commission) exposed organized crime's infiltration into
legitimate business activities.' 1 In response, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the ABA Commission on Organized
Crime.' 14 By 1960, the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field (the McClellan Committee) revealed the corruption of labor unions by criminal
elements. 115 Later, the McClellan Committee exposed the Mafia's
(or La Cosa Nostra's) national structure. 116 Finally, in 19.68, the
President's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice (the Katzenbach Commission) released a report explaining
organized crime's tactics in acquiring control of legitimate businesses 1 17 and suggesting antitrust-type measures for curbing this infiltration."18 This report encouraged Congress to enact legislation
113 S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1951) ("One of the most perplexing
problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the fact that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business
enterprises."). See also Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014 n.21
(1980).
The Kefauver Commission listed the following as those industries invaded by organized crime: advertising, amusement, appliances, automobiles, baking, ballrooms,
bowling alleys, banking, basketball, boxing, cigarette distribution, coal, communications, construction, drug stores, electrical equipment, florists, food, football, garment,
gas, hotels, import/export, insurance, jukebox, laundry, liquor, loans, news services,
newspapers, oil, paper products, radio, real estate, restaurants, scrap, shipping, steel
surplus, television, theatres and transportation. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
170-81 (1951) [hereinafter KEFAUVER COMM'N].
114
Hearingson S.30 and Related ProposalsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538, 544 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings on S.30].

115 See generally S. REP. No. 1784, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (describing various
influences and perversions of organized crime on organized labor); S. REP. No. 621,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (same).
116 See generally S. REP. No. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (illustrating the organizational structure of certain "families"); see also Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249 (1982).
117
The Commission noted, "Control of business concerns has usually been acquired through one of four methods: (I) investing concealed profits acquired from
gambling and other illegal activities; (2) accepting business interests in payment of the
owner's gambling debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and (4) using various forms
of extortion."

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADM. OF JUSTICE

190

(1967) [hereinafter KATZENBACH COMM'N].
118 Id. at 208. This suggestion constitutes the origin of civil RICO. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 113, at 1015 n.25 (the insight of the easier civil standard of proof,
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officially permitting the Department of Justice to use the antitrust
theories it had creatively applied in combating racketeering in labor
unions. 1 9
Against this backdrop, in 1967 Senator Roman L. Hruska introduced Senate bills 2048 and 2049, precursors of RICO. Senate bill
2048 proposed amending the Sherman Antitrust Act to prohibit investment of unreported income into a business and contained both
criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms.' 20 Senate bill 2049
proposed supplementing S.2048 by prohibiting the investment of
proceeds of criminal activity in a business enterprise.' 2 1 In 1969,
Senator John L. McClellan introduced Senate bill 30 which lacked a
provision like RICO. 122 Later, Senators McClellan and Hruska
jointly introduced Senate bill 1861123 to strengthen S.30. Senate

bill 1861 evolved into RICO.
Congress dearly enacted RICO to curb the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business activities. 12 4 The Senate Juextensive discovery and antitrust remedies "was the origin of the two-tract approachcriminal and civil-of RICO.").
1 19
See KATZENBACH COMM'N, supra note 117, at 465-86 (endorsing legislation to specifically allow the U.S. Attorney to use antitrust weapons in combatting organized
crime); see, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S.
94 (1962) (federal government brought civil action against a labor union, one of its
business agents, and four self-employed independent contractors who were members of
the union to terminate violations of § I of the Sherman Act); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.) (the government charged that
defendants conspired to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing "to fix prices, allocate customers, rig bids and coerce other refuse removers to join the conspiracy"), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966); United States v. Bitz, 282 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1960) (the
indictment alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for, among other
things, a combination and conspiracy among defendants to restrain members of the
union in their wholesale distribution of newspapers and magazines by coercing and
compelling them to pay defendants various sums of money as a prerequisite to getting
labor contracts with the union, to avoid strikes or the continuation of current strikes).
120
S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Senator Hruska hoped to incorporate the
methods of antitrust laws, arguing during floor debate that "[t]he antitrust laws now
provide a well established vehicle for attacking anticompetitive activity of all kinds. They
contain broad discovery provisions as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinarily broad and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against the
'legitimate' business activities of organized crime." 113 Cong. Rec. 17,999 (1967).
121
S.2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). S.2049 prohibited (1) the acquisition of an
interest in a business affecting interstate commerce with income derived from listed
criminal activities and (2) the agent of a corporation from authorizing the corporation to
engage in any of the listed criminal activities. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 113, at
1015-16 n.27.
122
S.30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 39,906 (1969) (This bill later evolved
into the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.).
123 The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 9568-9571 (1969).
124
The report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that "[RICO] has
as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st
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diciary Committee released a voluminous list of infiltrated
businesses 125 and identified the perverse effects of organized crime,
noting that the current criminal laws could not remedy the problem. 126 RICO provided new criminal remedies in the form of criminal forfeitures 12 7 and new civil remedies roughly modeled after
28
antitrust law.'
2.

Brief Legislative History of RICO

The legislative history of RICO reveals that although Congress
was influenced by antitrust remedies,' 29 Congress carefully drafted
RICO outside the scheme of antitrust law.' 3 0 Although the early
precursors of RICO' 3 ' proposed amendments to the Sherman Act
to combat organized crime, Congress elected to adopt antitrust
mechanisms in a separate statutory scheme.
While neither the Senate nor the House took any action on
RICO's forerunners, S.2048 and S.2049, the American Bar Association (ABA) studied them extensively. The ABA endorsed the use of
the machinery of the antitrust statutes to attack organized crime, but
recommended that "any such legislation be enacted as an independent statute and not be included in the Sherman Act, or any other
antitrust law."' 1 2 It recommended an independent statute because
the goal of antitrust law-free competition-might not always coincide with the goal of curtailing organized crime.13 3 A separate statutory scheme for organized crime control provisions would also
relieve the statutory remedies from the restrictive judicial preceCong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate RICO Report]; see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (remarking that RICO is aimed to combat the
influence of organized crime in legitimate enterprises); United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (same).
125

See KATZENBACH COMM'N, supra note 117, at 190.

126 Id. at 78. The Katzenbach Commission's Report contends that penalties of fine
and imprisonment cannot remove organized crime from legitimate business because organized syndicates still retain their property. When the property of the syndicate remains, "new leaders will step forward to take the place of those wejail." H.R. Doc. No.
105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (quoting President Nixon's remarks in his message on
"Organized Crime" of April 23, 1969).
127 1969 Senate RICO Report, supra note 124, at 79-80.
128

Id. at 80-83.

Id.
130 See Blakey, supra note 116, at 280 ("Congress deliberately redrafted RICO
outside of the antitrust statutes, so that it would not be limited by antitrust concepts like
'competitive,' 'commercial,' or 'direct or indirect' injury.") (emphasis in original).
131 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
132 See House Hearings on S.30, supra note 114, at 149.
133 See Blakey, supra note 116, at 255 ("[T]he ABA suggested that the underlying
theory of the antitrust law-the maintenance of competition-might make the direct use
of the antitrust laws maladapted to the goal of curtailing organized crime's influence in
the upperworld.").
129
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dents appropriate in antitrust law.' 3 4
OnJanuary 15, 1969, Senator McClellan introduced the Organized Crime Control Bill (S.30).1 3 5 At that time the bill included no
provisions like RICO. On March 20 of that year, Senator Hruska
proposed S. 1623,136 which provided for civil and criminal attacks on
organized crime.13 7 Later, Senators McClellan and Hruska jointly
introduced Senate bill 1861 (the Corrupt Organizations Act),13 8
from which RICO evolved.' 3 9 Initially, S.1861 lacked the treble
damages and the private equitable relief that RICO would eventually provide. 14 0 Explaining the new bill, Senator McClellan remarked that it borrowed many of its remedies from the antitrust
laws, but he added that it carried "no intention... of importing the
great complexity of antitrust law enforcement into"' 14 1 the enforcement of S.1861. Congress eventually adopted S.1861 as title IX of
S.30.142
On January 23, 1970, the Senate passed S.30 by a vote of 73 to
1.143 The ABA endorsed S.30, suggesting a number of amendments
including a provision for a private treble damages action. 144 Section
4 of the Clayton Act which provides for treble damages 145 influenced the ABA's suggestion.' 46 The House Judiciary Committee
amended title IX of S.30 to include the treble damage remedy, 147
adopting almost verbatim the language of section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 148 The House finally passed S.30 by a vote of 341 to 26.149
134
House Hearingson S. 30, supra note 114, at 149 (If the statutory schemes were not
separated "a private litigant would have to contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust context ...").
135 S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769 (1969).
136 S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
137
See Blakey, supra note 116, at 261.
138
The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115

CONG. REC. 9568-71 (1969).
139
See generally Blakey, supra note 116, at 262-83 (discussing the history of S. 1861
from its introduction to its evolution into RICO).
140
See id. at 262 ("As introduced S.1861 did not... expressly include provisions for
private equitable relief or treble damages.").
141 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969).
142
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 83 (1969).
143 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
144
House Hearings on S.30, supra note 114, at 543-44 (statement of Edward L. Wright,
President-elect of the ABA).
145 Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
146
See House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 114, at 543-44 (statement of Edward L.
Wright, President-Elect of the ABA) ("In the portion seeking to add a proposed Section
1964, 'Civil Remedies,' we would recommend an amendment to include the additional
civil remedy of authorizing private damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of
the Clayton Act.").
147 H.R. 19586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
148
Compare the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act which reads in pertinent
part,

1066

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1047

The Senate accepted the House amendments to S.30 without a conference, 5 0 and on October 15, 1970, the President signed the bill,
including RICO, into law.'-5
The legislative history reveals that neither Congress as a whole
nor RICO's drafters ever considered the issue of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. As G. Robert Blakey,
the chief counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures and RICO's principal drafter, remarked, " 'There is
nothing on the face of the statute or in the legislative history' that
touches on the question of concurrent jurisdiction ....
'To my
knowledge, no one even thought of the issue.' "152
3.

Civil RICO in the Courts

Congress enacted RICO primarily to provide another tool to
combat the pervasive problem of organized crime's infiltration into
legitimate businesses. 15 3 Unfortunately, RICO's treble damages
provision and its provision returning plaintiff's litigation costs have
attracted private litigants in ordinary business disputes to attach
civil RICO counts to claims involving commercial fraud, 15 4 breach
of contract, 15 5 and other activities unconnected to organized
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) with the language of § 1964(c) of RICO,
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The committee's other amendments narrowed the scope of
the bill. For example, Congress narrowed the statutory definition of "unlawful debt" to
exclude debts from legal gambling, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1982)), and restricted the statutory definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" to at least two occurring within ten years of each other. Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982)); see also Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 113, at 1020.
149
116 CONG. REC. 35,363 (1970).
150
116 CONG. REC. 36,296 (1970).
151
116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970).
152 Flaherty, Two States Lay Claim to RICO, NAT'L LJ., May 7,1984, at 10, col. 2 (quoting G. Robert Blakey).
153
See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (plaintiffs contended that insurers' and underwriters' refusal to pay claims in an
effort to force a lower settlement coupled with the use of the mails violated RICO).
155
See, e.g., American Soc'y of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery & Ophthalmology
v. Murray Communications, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiff asserted
breach of contract along with use of the mails violated RICO).
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crime. 15 6 RICO includes wire, mail and securities fraud within its
definition of racketeering' activity. 15 7 This allows most plaintiffs in
litigation involving ordinary business disputes to allege reasonably
that facts underlying the dispute suggest a pattern of racketeering
activity under RICO. 15 8 One survey shows that few civil RICO ac59
tions actually involve cases of organized criminal activity.'
In response to these perceived misuses of civil RICO, some
courts created limitations to restrict RICO's scope. 160 Most courts,
however, have retained the broad approach, refusing to add judicial
gloss to RICO's plain language.' 6 1 The Supreme Court has rejected
judicial attempts to limit the scope of RICO. In Sedima, S.P.L.R. v.
Imrex Co.,162 the Court expressly rejected a restriction that would
prohibit a plaintiff from maintaining a civil RICO suit against a defendant unless the defendant had already been convicted of a criminal RICO offense. 163 It reasoned that the word "conviction"
appears nowhere in RICO and the language of RICO suggests that
the civil defendant need not be convicted in order to face civil liability. 164 The Court also rejected the judicially created "racketeering
156 See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (concerning control of a Chassidic congregation).
157 See Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 133, 135 n.8 (1986).
158 Id. at 134-35.
159 ABA SECTION OF CORP. BANKING & BUSINESS LAw, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL
RICO TASK FORCE 56 (1985) [hereinafter RICO TASK FORCE REPORT]. Of the 270 civil
RICO cases reported by trial courts through 1984, only nine percent involved "allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals." Id.
Forty percent involved securities fraud, 37% involved common law fraud in a commercial setting, 4% involved antitrust and unfair competition, 4% involved bribery, 3% involved fraud not related to securities or to business transactions, 2% involved labor
related matters, and 1% involved theft or conversion. Ia-at 55-56. In addition the report tracked a recent explosion of civil RICO claims. Of the 270 cases, 43% were decided in 1984, the last year studied, 33% in 1983, 13% in 1982, 7% in 1981, 2% in
1980, and only 3% in the decade of the 1970s. Id. at 55.
160 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring a crimlnal RICO conviction for civil RICO liability), rev'd 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (adopting the racketeering
injury requirement), aff'd sub. nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1984); Harper v. NewJapan Sec. Int'l Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (adopting
the racketeering injury requirement); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc, 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (creating a "nexus to organized crime" requirement).
161 See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1351, 1356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
162 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
163 Id-at 488.
164 Id. at 488 ("The language of RICO gives no obvious indication that a civil action
can proceed only after a criminal conviction. The word 'conviction' does not appear in
any relevant portion of the statute. To the contrary, the predicate acts involve conduct
that is 'chargeable' or 'indictable' and 'offense[s]' that are 'punishable,' under various
criminal statutes.") (citations omitted).
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injury requirement" which required civil RICO plaintiffs to prove
damages beyond those caused by the predicate acts of the alleged
RICO offense.1 65 The Court rejected this limitation, remarking that
it felt "hampered by the vagueness of that concept,"' 166 calling the
requirement "amorphous,"'' 6 7 and finding no hint of it in the statute.' 68 It concluded that, in fact, RICO provides remedies for damages caused by the predicate acts. 16 9 While a number of district
courts required some connection between the defendant and organized crime 170 every circuit court directly considering this limitation
71
on civil RICO has rejected it.
Even though many courts, including the Supreme Court, have
addressed RICO claims, some elements of RICO remain ambiguous.' 72 Most notably, no court has clearly defined a "pattern of
165 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("The words of § 1964 expressly require that a private plaintiff be injured 'by
reason of a violation of section 1962'.... Unless these words have no effect. ... plaintiff's injuries must derive from the 'pattern of racketeering activity' which violates
§ 1962 rather than directly from the underlying acts which combine to constitute that
pattern."), aff'd sub. nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (1984);Johnsen v.
Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (same); Harper v. NewJapan Sec. Int'l Inc.,
545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (adopting the racketeering injury requirement);
North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (adopting
the racketeering injury requirement because if none existed every bad faith breach of
contract or common law fraud in which defendant used the mails would violate RICO).
166 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 494.
167
Id. at 495.
168
Id. ("Given that 'racketeering activity' consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate act, § 1961(1), we are initially doubtful about a requirement of a
'racketeering injury' separate from the harm from the predicate acts. A reading of the
statute belies any such requirement.").
169 Id. at 497 ("[T]he compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern ....
).
170 In Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), for example, the
plaintiff alleged that a telephone answering service violated RICO by mailing fraudulent
bills to its customers. The court did not recognize plaintiff's RICO claim because plaintiff failed to allege that the answering service was a member of "a society of criminals
operating outside the law." Id. at 113. See also Hokama v. E.F. Hutton, Co., 566 F. Supp.
636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (adopting the nexus to organized crime requirement for a civil
RICO claim by holding that "plaintiffs must allege some link to organized crime, however defined"); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (adopting the nexus to organized crime requirement).
171 See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding both
the statutory language and legislative history of RICO to authorize suits against defendants with no connection to organized crime); see Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d
5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to add the nexus to organized crime requirement to
RICO's language), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1063-64 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that RICO's legislative history rejects the nexus to
organized crime requirement), aff'd on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
172
See generally Comment, Civil RICO After Sedima: An Exercise in Restraint, 22 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 153, 159-68 (1987) (analyzing in detail ambiguous elements in RICO).
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racketeering activity." 1 7 3 Section 1961(5) requires at least two acts
of racketeering, but the Supreme Court has commented that "while
two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern.' ",174
The Court failed to announce when two or more acts create a pattern and when they do not. Lower courts have not arrived at a uni1 75
form interpretation.
II
ANALYSIS:

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL

RICO CLAIMS

Any analysis addressing the question ofjurisdiction under civil

RICO,176 or under any federal statute, begins with the presumption

173 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). See Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for
"Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REv. 971 (1988).
174 Sedima, 497 U.S. at 496 n.14.
175 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d
966, 970 (11 th Cir. 1986) (rejecting an argument that each predicate act had to occur in
separate criminal episodes to constitute a pattern); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips,
771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that each predicate act in a single scheme is
an act that can contribute to a pattern); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc.,
770 F.2d 717, 718 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985) (defining a pattern as "continuity plus relationship" rather than sporadic activity), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); see also Comment,
supra note 172, at 159-61 (reviewing various courts' interpretations of a "pattern of racketeering activity").
176 The RICO jurisdictional issue usually arises in one of three contexts. First, a
defendant in state court may move to dismiss the RICO claim against him for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cianci v. Superior Court (Poppingo), 40 Cal.3d
903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985) (denying demurrer to RICO. claim by
declaring jurisdiction over civil RICO). Second, a defendant in federal court may assert
resjudicata as an affirmative defense to a RICO claim brought after state court litigation.
See, e.g., Carman v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment which maintained that plaintiffs were precluded by
a prior state judgment); Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The doctrine of res judicata precludes not only what was actually litigated in a previous action
but also that which could have been litigated. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597 (1948) (resjudicata provides that a valid judgment binds the parties "not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat a claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose.") (quoting Cromwell v. County, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)); see also WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

4406 (quoting the language of

Commissioner v. Sunnen and reiterating its holding). But a state court judgment cannot
have preclusive effect if the state court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980) (plaintiff is not precluded from

raising a subsequent action if the court in the prior action lacked subject matterjurisdiction to hear that claim). Third, a plaintiffmay argue that removal of a civil RICO case to
a federal district court is improper because the state court in which he brought the action lacked competence to hear it. See, e.g., Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (federal court had removal jurisdiction
over civil RICO claim because California state courts have such jurisdiction). Removal
jurisdiction of federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982), is derivative of the jurisdiction
of the original state court. See Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 258 U.S.
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that state courts share concurrent jurisdiction.1 7 7 The presumption
of concurrent jurisdiction may only be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction, 178 by an unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction from the legislative history of the
statute, 17 9 or by a clear incompatibility between state-court adjudication of the federal claim and the federal interests embodied in
it.180 RICO satisfies none of these three factors.
A.

No Explicit Statutory Directive of Exclusive Jurisdiction
Under RICO

RICO's jurisdictional grant contains neither an explicit statutory directive of concurrent jurisdiction nor an explicit directive of
exclusive jurisdiction. Instead it employs permissive language similar to that which the Supreme Court has already determined comports with the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.18 ' As such,
the language of RICO's jurisdictional grant cannot support a conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction.
The RICO jurisdictional grant provides that "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.' 8 2
Such a grant does not constitute an explicit directive of exclusive
jurisdiction because it fails to employ the word "exclusive."'' 8 3 Similarly, the grant does not explicitly provide concurrent jurisdiction
because the word "concurrent" does not appear in it.184
Courts almost uniformly have held that language similar to the
jurisdictional language in RICO fails to rebut the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction. They reason that the word "may" does not
preclude state-court adjudication because it represents a permissive
377, 382 (1922) ("If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the
parties, the federal court acquires none [through removal], although it might in a like
suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction."); but see IA MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, 0.157[3.3] (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) allows the federal
court to acquire jurisdiction over an exclusively federal action brought in state court.).
177
See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 77-112 and accompanying text.
181
See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (construing the
use of the word "may" in the jurisdictional language of the Labor Relations Act as permissible and hence conferring concurrent jurisdiction.); see also supra notes 42-51 and
accompanying text.
182
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
183
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
184
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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rather than a restrictive term. 185 Similarly, the permissive language
of RICO fails to limit claims to federal courts; the language constitutes no explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction.
No court, either state or federal, has directly asserted that the
jurisdictional language of RICO provides an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction. Courts finding federal jurisdiction
over RICO have generally based their conclusion on RICO's legislative history' 8 6 or on the incompatibility of state-court jurisdiction
with federal interests in civil RICO claims. 187 One district court' 88
and one state court' 89 have held, however, that an in pari materia19 0
reading of RICO indicates exclusive jurisdiction because section
1961191 of the Act defines predicate acts in terms of federal substantive crimes, because section 1963192 criminal prosecutions fall
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, because section 1965193 venue
and process provisions apply only in federal courts, and because
section 1966194 empowers only the United States Attorney General
to act thereunder.' 95
These courts start from the mistaken premise that reading a
statute in pai materia can reveal an explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction. Explicit directives could not call for such sublime deduction and still be labeled explicit. Hence, all statutes
jurisdiction have emcontaining an explicit directive of exclusive
96
text.'
their
in
ployed the word "exclusive"
See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Levinson v. American Accident Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del.
187
Ch. 1985) (relying on similarity to the Clayton Act, uniformity of interpretation and
expertise of federal judges).
188 Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-71 (E.D. Wash.
1985).
189 Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985) (following the holding in Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration).
In pari materia is defined as "upon the same matter or subject." Statutes in pari
190
materia should be construed together. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
191 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
192 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
193 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982).
'94
18 U.S.C. § 1966 (Supp. IV 1986).
195 Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
In the instant case, if one views the statutory scheme dealing with
RICO broadly, then there are most assuredly indicia militating in favor of
exclusivity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (predicate acts defined in terms of substantive federal crime); § 1963 (criminal prosecutions exclusively federal
by unmistakable implication); § 1965 (extended venue and process provisions applicable only in federal courts); § 1966 (only Attorney General
empowered to act thereunder); § 1967 (limited to actions involving the
United States); and § 1968 (only Attorney General may act thereunder).
Id
196 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
185

186
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Furthermore, these courts are mistaken in their analysis of
RICO. In noting that section 1961 defines predicate acts in terms of
federal substantive crimes, they forget that section 1961(1)(A) defines predicate acts in terms of state substantive laws. 19 7 In noting
that criminal prosecutions under section 1963 are limited to federal
courts, the courts fail to recognize that Congress has explicitly
granted exclusive jurisdiction over all federal crimes to federal
courts.1 9 8 These courts also fail to consider, that Congress may
have limited RICO's venue and process provisions to federal court
based on a belief that it can more legitimately prescribe federalcourt procedure than state-court procedure. 19 9 The fact that section 1966 empowers only the United States Attorney General to act
thereunder sheds no light on the jurisdictional issue because section
1966 applies only to actions instituted by the United States as a
0
party. 20
Notwithstanding these cases, the clear weight of authority, both
in the interpretations of RICO and comparable statutes, supports
the proposition that the jurisdictional language in RICO creates no
explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction. The legal standards for interpreting jurisdictional grants, emanating from Dowd
Box, 2 0 1 support this notion.
B.

No Unmistakable Implication of Exclusive Jurisdiction from
RICO's Legislative History

The legislative history of RICO provides no unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction. The legislative history reveals
that neither Congress nor RICO's drafters ever considered the issue
20 2 If
of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.
neither Congress nor the drafters considered the jurisdictional issue, RICO's legislative history cannot contain an unmistakable implication that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction over
197 That subsection reads, "(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
... 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
198
18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982); see supra note 32.
199 Perhaps Congress holds this belief because the Constitution charges it with the
power to create and define lower federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The legislative
history of RICO sheds no light on this idea.
200 18 U.S.C. § 1966 (Supp. IV 1986) (allowing the United States Attorney General
to expedite an action instituted by the United States in a district court if, in his opinion,
the case holds general public importance).
201 368 U.S. 502 (1962); see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
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RICO. 20 3
Several courts have nonetheless found that the legislative history of RICO provides an unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction. 20 4 These courts hold that in adopting the language of the
Clayton Act as RICO's jurisdictional grant, 20 5 Congress intended to
20 6
incorporate the Clayton Act's exclusive jurisdiction into RICO.
Courts have interpreted jurisdiction under both the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act as exclusively federal. 20 7 The legislative
history of these laws shows that Congress enacted both laws after
rejecting amendments to provide explicit concurrent jurisdiction. 20 8
RICO, however, has no similar legislative history. While pending in
Congress, no one proposed an amendment to make jurisdiction
under RICO explicitly concurrent or explicitly exclusive. 2 09 Again,
2 10
no one considered the jurisdictional question.
Perhaps courts' interpret the Clayton Act as granting exclusive
jurisdiction because the Clayton Act joins the Sherman Act as part
of the larger antitrust statutory scheme and courts have found juris2 11
diction under the Sherman Act to be exclusively federal.
Although RICO incorporates antitrust language, the legislative history dearly shows that Congress specifically drafted RICO outside
the antitrust scheme. Precursors to RICO, S.2048 and S.2049 proposed amendments to the Sherman Act to combat organized
crime,2 1 2 but Congress never considered these bills. Congress later
passed versions drafted specifically outside the antitrust scheme to
203
See HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1986) (suggesting that if
no one thought of the jurisdictional issue, no unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction can exist).
204
See, e.g., Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986)
(adoption of the Clayton Act language into RICO presents an unmistakable implication
that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO claims); County of Cook v.
Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d
892 (7th Cir. 1985); Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. Washington-Golf
Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 501 N.E.2d 1290 (1986) (same); Greenview Trading Co. v.
Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1985) (same).
205
See supra note 148.
206 See, e.g., County of Cook, 574 F. Supp. at 912 ("Legislators must have known that
courts have construed virtually identical language as giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. It would be anomalous for this court to hold that the
jurisdictional grant in the RICO statute did anything other than create exclusive federal
jurisdiction over civil claims by persons injured by violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.");
Greenview Trading, 108 A.D.2d at 471, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 (restating the exact language of County of Cook).
207
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
209
See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 113, at 1020 (discussing amendments proposed
to S. 30).
210
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
211
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
212
See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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avoid the restrictive precedents of antitrust law.2 13 Consequently,
the mere use of antitrust language does not mean that RICO is part
of the antitrust statutory scheme nor that jurisdiction must be consistent with antitrust jurisdiction.
On closer inspection, RICO's adoption of the Clayton Act language fails to provide an unmistakable implication that Congress intended to convey exclusive jurisdiction. Courts utilizing the Clayton
Act analogy must impute to Congress a consideration of the jurisdictional issue and an intent to make jurisdiction exclusive. It is difficult to believe that a majority of a diverse collective body such as
Congress would follow this thought process to reach the conclusion
of exclusive jurisdiction without a word about the issue in the legislative history. The legislative history indicates that Congress
adopted the language of the Clayton Act only to provide a treble
damages remedy for private RICO claimants like that in the Clayton
Act.2 1 4 This purpose in no way implicates the jurisdictional issue.21 5
C.

No Clear Incompatibility Between State-Court Adjudication
and Federal Interests

RICO fails to satisfy the third prong of the Guf Offshore test,
whether there exists a "disabling incompatibility" between state
court adjudication and the federal interests embodied in the statute.2 1 6 As noted earlier, the Second Circuit recently has remarked
that rebuttal of the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction through
this prong of the analysis "would take a truly extraordinary set of
circumstances." 2 1 7 An analysis of RICO under this third prong
reveals no clear incompatibility between state adjudication and federal interests to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction will not promote uniform interSee supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
Congress adopted the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act at the ABA's
suggestion. But the ABA merely sought a private cause of action for treble damages. See
supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
215 -See, e.g., County of Cook, 773 F.2d at 905 n.4 (dictum) ("We doubt whether the
analogy to antitrust law is sufficiently strong to conclude that because jurisdiction over
antitrust cases is exclusively federal, RICO jurisdiction necessarily must follow suit); see
also Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Given the absence of
indication that Congress even considered the issue, as well as the intended breadth and
remedial goals of RICO, we cannot find the required implication [of exclusive jurisdiction]."); Cianci v. Superior Court (Poppingo), 40 Cal. 3d 903, 911-14, 710 P.2d 375,
378-80, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-80 (1985) (concluding that the legislative history of
RICO fails to provide an unmistakable implication of exclusive jurisdiction because
Congress never considered the issue and because the Clayton Act language was adopted
to provide private relief rather than exclusive jurisdiction).
216
See supra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
Nordlicht v. New York Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
217
U.S. 1055 (1987); see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
213
214
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pretation of RICO. First, much of the law applicable to RICO is not
conducive to uniform interpretation since the content of many pred2 18
icate acts depends on state law which varies from state to state.
As the Supreme Court announced in applying this third prong to
another federal statute incorporating state law, "[t]here is no need
'21 9
for uniform interpretation of laws that vary from State to State.
Moreover, Supreme Court review of federal questions can direct
2 20
uniform interpretation.
The Supreme Court has taken steps to preserve uniform interpretation of RICO. It has reduced the opportunities for judicial
gloss by binding itself closely to RICO's statutory text. 22 1 In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 2 22 for example, the Court rejected two judicially developed restrictions designed to limit RICO claims to activities more closely associated with organized crime. 223 Certain
elements of the RICO cause of action remain unclear, leaving some
room for varying state court interpretations. It does not appear, that
in the RICO context exclusive jurisdiction will promote uniformity
of interpretation. Indeed, federal courts have developed all of the
judicial glosses that jeopardized uniform interpretation of RICO
224
before Sedima.
No evidence suggests that federal judges enjoy greater expertise over civil RICO claims than state judges. In fact, state judges
may have superior expertise in applying the incorporated state law
defining predicate acts. 22 5 State adoption of "little RICO" statutes
has afforded state courts with even more opportunities to address
concepts in RICO beyond the predicate acts. 2 26 Commentators
218
18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). In addition, section 1961(6) makes the
definition of "unlawful debt" partially contingent on state or municipal law. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(6) (1982). Interpretation of the predicate acts cannot be uniform unless the
state law definitions and elements of those predicate acts are uniform as well.
219
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981) (determining
jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to be concurrent).
220
See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
221
Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) (rejecting the proposition that a defendant must be criminally convicted of a RICO violation before the court
can impose civil liability because the statutory text defines predicate acts as "indictable"
or "chargeable"); id. at 495 (rejecting the "racketeering injury requirement" because
"[a] reading of the statute belies any such requirement").
222
473 U.S. 479 (1985).
223
See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
224
See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
225
See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 484 (applying the third prong of the rebuttal test to
OCSLA and concluding that federal courts have no greater expertise over a federal
claim when the federal claim incorporates state law as its governing rules).
226 States that have adopted their own versions of civil RICO include Arizona (ARm.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 - 13-2317 (1978 & Supp. 1987)), Colorado (COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 18-17-101 - 18-17-109 (1986 & Supp. 1987)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1
§§ 1501-1511 (1987)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01-895.09 (West Supp. 1988)),
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have remarked that "there may be situations where state courts have
gained considerable experience by enforcing similar state
laws ..

."227

No state-court inhospitality to federal RICO claims exists to
jeopardize federal interests. As noted in the context of civil rights
litigation, state courts may display disdain for federal claims when
the interests of the locality differ greatly from federal interests. 228
But twenty-two states in all regions of the nation have already shown
that they share the same interest expressed in RICO by enacting
their own versions of that statute. 2 29 Furthermore, state courts are
more than likely to be sympathetic to RICO claims because they may
in fact be applying state law. In applying the third prong in similar
circumstances, the Supreme Court remarked that state judges "certainly cannot be thought unsympathetic to a claim only because it is
23 0
labeled federal rather than state law."
Finally, concurrent jurisdiction relieves some of the burden
from the federal dockets. As the ABA's Ad Hoc Task Force on Civil
RICO reported, 23 ' the number of civil RICO claims in federal court
alone has skyrocketed over recent years, and given the Sedima
Court's rejection of judicial limitations on civil RICO, 23

2

this trend

may continue. Some state courts hear civil RICO claims now. Exclusive jurisdiction would add these cases to the federal dockets.
No clear incompatibility between state-court adjudication of
RICO claims and federal interests exists to rebut the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction. State court adjudication of civil RICO
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 - 16-14-15 (1981), Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 8421 - 842-12 (1976)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 - 18-7805 (1987)), Indiana
(IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1, 2 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1988)), Mississippi (MIss. CODE

§§ 97-43-1 - 97-43-11 (Supp. 1988)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.350207.520 (Michie 1986)), New Jersey (167 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c:41-1 - 41-6.2 (West
1982)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 - 30-42-6 (1984)), New York (N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 460.00-460.80 (McKinney Supp. 1988)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 75D-1 - 75D-14 (1987)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-05 - 12.106.1-08 (1985 & Supp. 1987)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-2923.36 (Anderson 1987)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715-166.735 (1985)), Pennsylvania (18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988)), Rhode Island, (R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 7-15-1 - 7-15-11 (1985)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 - 76-10-1608
(1987), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.010-9A.82.900 (Supp. 1987)),
ANN.

and Wisconsin (WIs.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 946.80-946.87 (West Supp. 1987)). In addition "lit-

tle RICO" statutes are pending in Alaska, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
227
Redish & Muench, supra note 22, at 334.
228
See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
229
See supra note 226.
230 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 484 (applying the factor of possible state-court inhospitality to claims under OCSLA and concluding that state courts will not harbor antagonism for a federal claim that incorporates state law as its governing rule).
231
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
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claims will advance rather than jeopardize the federal interests expressed in RICO. Because RICO defines so many of the predicate
acts upon which a claim can be based in terms of state substantive
law, 23 3 RICO does not require exclusive federal jurisdiction to promote uniformity of interpretation. Additionally, the incorporation
of state law means that federal judges enjoy no greater expertise
over RICO claims than statejudges. Indeed, on some RICO issues,
state judges may have greater expertise than federal judges. Furthermore, state adoption of "little RICO" statutes 23 4 indicates that
state are sympathetic to RICO claims. Finally, concurrent jurisdiction advances federal interests by relieving some of the burden from
the federal dockets.
III
PROPOSAL

This Note proposes that Congress amend section 1964(c) of
RICO to include an explicit statutory directive of concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. The jurisdictional language of
RICO in its amended form should read:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court, which shall share concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts of the several States, and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Such an amendment would resolve the jurisdictional issue and free
litigants to concentrate on the substantive aspects of RICO.
More importantly, this amendment would curb a recent trend
of federal-court deference to state-court denial of jurisdiction over
RICO when a claimant raises the jurisdictional issue to rebut a defense of res judicata. 2 35 For example, in Cullen v. Margiotta,23 6 the
233

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). That section provides,
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,

kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year....
234
235

See supra note 226.
See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 732 (2d Cir. 1987) (In giving alterna-

tive arguments for dismissing a RICO claim, the court noted that a federal court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as
the courts of the state could give it and concluded that New York courts would not given

a dismissal of a RICO claim by another New York court res judicata effect because New
York courts have held that they lack jurisdiction over those claims), cert. denied sub nom.
Nassau County Republican Comm. v. Cullen, 107 S. Ct. 3226 (1987). Cf Printing MartMorristown, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 650 F. Supp. 1444, 1449-50 (D.NJ. 1987) (without deciding the jurisdictional issue under RICO, the court held that the plaintiff was required to
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Second Circuit held that res judicata did not preclude the plaintiff's
RICO claim because the New York courts, in .which he brought an
earlier action without asserting a RICO claim, had held that they
lack jurisdiction over RICO claims. 23 7 The court reasoned that, as
the analog of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, 23 8
28 U.S.C. § 1738239 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as other courts of that state
would give them. 2 40 Federal courts cannot give a state court judgment greater preclusive effect than the courts of the state would give
it.241 A state court judgment cannot have preclusive effect if the
state court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. 242 Thus, the Cullen
court concluded that a prior state court judgment does not bar a
subsequent RICO action in federal court when the courts of the
state have determined that they lack jurisdiction to hear RICO
claims. 24 3 Therefore, without amendment of the statute, RICO
claims that would otherwise be brought in state court will be thrust
onto the federal courts. This result will duplicate the litigation required to adjudicate the case and will also add to the burden on
federal dockets by removing the defense of res judicata in certain
circumstances.
raise its RICO claims in state court to allow the state court an opportunity to decide
whether it has jurisdiction, especially given the conflict of authority on this issue).
236
811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nassau County Republican Comm. v.
Cullen, 107 S. Ct. 3226 (1987).
237
Id. at 732.
238
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceeding of every State .... ).
239 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part,
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
240
Cullen, 811 F.2d at 732.
241
See Marrese v. Am. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 384 (1985)
("This proposition [that § 1738 allows a federal court to give a state-court judgment
greater preclusive effect than the state courts themselves would give it], however, was
rejected by [the Supreme Court]."); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75 (1984) (remanding a district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because it was unclear whether the district court applied state or federal preclusionary law;
if federal preclusionary law under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 could give a state court judgment
greater preclusive effect than the courts of the state would give, there would be no reason to remand).
242
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs § 26(1)(c) (1980) (plaintiff is not precluded from raising a claim in a subsequent action if the court of the prior action lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear that claim).
243
Cullen, 811 F.2d at 732 (allowing RICO claim because under New York law claim
is not barred if the court in the prior action lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim and because New York regards RICO jurisdiction as exclusively federal).
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IV
CONCLUSION

State courts share concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
over civil RICO claims. The analysis of such a jurisdictional question begins with the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. The
analysis also provides three .prongs which can rebut the presumption,2 44 none of which successfully rebuts the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. RICO's jurisdictional
grant provides no explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction. Courts have held similar language in other statutes to be consistent with the presumption. 24 5 Nothing in RICO's legislative
history provides an unmistakable implication that Congress intended to limit RICO to federal courts; the legislative history provides no evidence that Congress ever considered or addressed the
question of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. 24 6 State-court adjudication of federal claims does not jeopardize federal interests.
The incorporation of state laws in defining the predicate acts of a
RICO violation negates the possibility of uniform interpretation of
those acts and also dispels fears that state courts lack the expertise
to hear these claims. 247 Additionally, state adoption of their own
versions of RICO indicates that state courts have sympathy for this
2 48
federal cause of action.
To eliminate lingering confusion over RICO's jurisdictional
grant, Congress should amend RICO to convey explicitly concurrent jurisdiction to state courts. Such an amendment will save the
time of courts and of litigants in contesting this issue. It will also
curb the recent deferral of federal courts to state court determinations of their own jurisdiction over RICO when the jurisdictional
issue arises in the res judicata context.

BasilJ. Musnuff
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246
247
248

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

18-22 and accompanying text.
37-54 and accompanying text.
202-03, 208-10 and accompanying text.
233-34 and accompanying text.
229-30 and accompanying text.

